March 29, 2005
Getting Back To Basics In The JTTF Oversight Debate
What We Still Don't Know About Current Practices
Ultimately, when it comes to oversight over the Portland Police Bureau personnel assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the questions that need to be answered before all others are fairly straightforward. Yet they are the very questions which to date have received no straightforward answers.
Over the past several months, we've seen the original hearing on JTTF participation postponed, the debate show up on FOX News, the head of the local FBI experiment in fear mongering, a Council member make confusing comments, the state's newspaper of record mis-report the story and abuse its op-ed page, the introduction of an oversight resolution, and various media and official examples of demogoguery.
Given all of that, you might be surprised to learn that some of the most fundamental issues remain unaddressed, but in fact that's the situation in which we all find ourselves. To be precise, there are two central questions which have yet to be answered in any substantial way.
First, we need to know just what sorts of information the officers assigned to the JTTF use in order to make the determination that they can self-certify their compliance with ORS 181.575 and ORS 181.850. For the purposes of answering this question, we can set aside all talk of "secret" and "top secret" and "need to know" and simply focus on the kind of information the officers use in order to submit that self-certification.
Even if, for the sake of argument, the City were to believe that self-certification is sufficient in theory, we cannot know if it is sufficient in practice until and unless we know just what is involved in the officers making that self-certification. So far, no one has ever said, which is precisely one reason why some of us are uncomfortable with the current processes.
Second, we need to know the actual details of the training provided to JTTF-assigned officers by the City Attorney's office in the provisions of ORS 181.575 and ORS 181.850. To date, all we know is that they are provided with some form of training in this regard, but we know absolutely nothing about what they are told, what materials are used to train them, and whether or not the training is detailed and involved or cursory and superficial.
Again, even if the City were to accept the premise of self-certification as adequate for oversight purposes, that premise cannot be accepted as policy until and unless we're fully informed as to the training provided which allegedly permits that self-certification. So far, we have not been.
Almost all of the other aspects of the debate fall into the category of questions whose answers mainly are relevant only if we fully understand the nature and details of our current oversight processes.
Right now -- after years of debating oversight, months of doing so very intensely, and only twenty-four hours before the issue comes before City Council -- we still do not have the answers to these questions.
Comments (2)
allehseya on 29 Mar 2005
Right now -- after years of debating oversight, months of doing so very intensely, and only twenty-four hours before the issue comes before City Council -- we still do not have the answers to these questions.
Which is why I support the Mayors Proposal. If our Mayor, The Chief of Police and the City Attorney can gain the clearance to address these concerns and ensure that there is adequate compliance to state laws -- I, for one, (all things considered) will rest a lot easier at night than I would in continuing PJTTF participation without it.
allehseya on 29 Mar 2005
I should add -- even if only for the duration that a new MoU can be arranged and agreed upon by those parties that addresses our concerns -- even if it means that the 'top security' clearance is only for the duration of reviewing and ensuring the process of compliance to state laws.