March 29, 2005
(Updated) 'Do your own research... Make your own decisions'
Robert Jordan's Credibility Problem
Note: This post has been updated. Any and all updates appear at the end of the original post.
Today's Oregonian marks the second time they've given over op-ed space to their own editorial position on the Joint Terrorism Task Force without yet having published the opposing argument in the same space, despite the common view that "[u]nlike a newspaper's signature editorial page where the discourse agenda is set by the editorial gatekeepers, the op-ed page is the one place in the paper where public discourse, through the mediation of a service editor, can emerge unfettered."
This time around, it's a piece by Robert Jordan, Special Agent-in-Charge of the FBI here in Portland. And just so we're clear, we're not arguing he shouldn't be gracing the paper's op-ed pages, just that the other side should be on there as well.
But enough of the meta/media discussion. On to the substance of Jordan's piece itself. While Jordan manages this time to avoid some of the more melodramatic statements he's made in the past, he still manages to confuse the issue. He also manages to not quite accurately reflect the content of the discussion so far.
Now, a resolution before the Portland City Council in regard to the Joint Terrorism Task Force would require the FBI to give even higher-level security clearances to politicians without any discussion of what those clearances really are or what sacrifices they require. There is also no acknowledgement that the FBI has already provided Portland Police Chief Derrick Foxworth and a number of his executive managers with secret-level clearances.
While Jordan is correct that the resolution doesn't mention these things, they certainly haven't been absent in the public and media discussion of the JTTF -- a discussion in which Jordan himself has participated, at the very least in last week's dueling press conferences. What he seems to be doing in the above is insinuating that no critics of the current JTTF oversight are addressing these issues. And that's patently false.
One other thing. To our knowledge, no one at the Portland Police Bureau or the FBI has ever indicated that "secret" clearances exist for anyone other than Chief Foxworth and one of his assistant chiefs -- and a single assistant chief does not equal "a number of his executive managers".
But then Jordan jumps head-first into the realm of distortion and sleight-of-hand. After listing the methods of oversight which he deems to be adequate (all Federal, by the way, despite the fact that Jordan himself admitted last week that they don't vet their investigations for compliance with state law), he veers off into the land of strawmen.
There are those who say that even this is not enough. They want full, unrestricted access to our computers and information systems in order to have "acceptable" oversight. This is neither possible nor necessary.
This is called, to be very kind to Jordan, misdirection.
No serious critic of current oversight procedures for local officers has demanded "full, unrestricted access to our computers and information systems". And even if one or two wingnuts had made such a demand, the bulk of the population which has criticized current JTTF oversight has not. Here, Jordan engages in nothing more than lying about what the critics are seeking, attributing to them a clearly-unreasonable demand which in fact they have not made, in order to paint all critics as out of touch with reality.
Not so incidentally, Jordan said last week that this issue really is just about trusting those who serve our community. But at this point we really must ask: How much credibility -- which breeds trust -- should we attribute to a man who consistently engages in these sorts of attempts to deliberately misrepresent his opponents' positions?
Jordan then gets into the issue of the discrepancy between security clearances offered to JTTF-assigned officers and those offered to the Chief and the Mayor (or, technically, the "police commissioner"), saying that "little, if any, information that any employee in my office comes into contact with is actually top secret."
That statement raises an entire series of questions that are going to nee to be addressed this week, based upon the commonly-communicated understanding of what the different levels of clearance allow. That standard explanation -- which we've never seen Jordan dispute -- in fact is repeated elsewhere in The Oregonian today.
The mayor and Police Chief Derrick Foxworth are eligible for "secret" clearances that allow access to details about an investigation, but not the source of the information. If a person suspected of terrorist intent came to Oregon, for example, the mayor and the police chief could be briefed on the suspect. But they would not be told where the tip originated.
In his op-ed piece, Jordan suggests that even the JTTF-assigned officers, who are given "top secret" clearance, rarely see anything above the "secret" level anyway. But if "secret" level indeed only permits knowledge of the target of an investigation, but not information on just how that person came to be the target of an investigation, Jordan's statement appears to cause a problem.
It's the matter of how a person became a target of an investigation that goes straight to the heart of whether or not the investigation is in violation of ORS 181.575 and ORS 181.850. If that "how" comes only with "top secret" clearance, and even the JTTF-assigned officers rarely come into contact with "top secret" information, we're left with a rather obvious question: How can the JTTF-assigned officers self-certify that they are in compliance with Oregon law?
In his conclusion, Jordan urges people to look beyond the rhetoric, do their own research, and make their own decisions. He also says people should check out the website of the local FBI "details on the JTTF" -- which is a truly laughable notion.
But in truth, we agree: Look beyond the rhetoric, do your own research, and make your own decisions. Unfortunately for Jordan, after doing all of those things you discover that it's his statements that are the ones to view with suspicion.
Update
We may have jumped the gun on the "laughable" notion of pointing to the local FBI website. Unnoticed by us until a few moments ago was this new page which they've posted to address JTTF issues. It likely was there earlier when we posted this item originally, but we managed to not see it at the time.
We'll have a fresh item up later today discussing what's in that new section.
Update
There's new information available tonight on the quesiton of how many people in the Police Bureau have security clearances for the JTTF. According to a Bureau memo obtained by KGW (pdf), there is a lieutenant, in addition to the Chief and an assistant chief, who also receives such clearance.
While that's more than one, it's still only two, which we suppose counts as "a number". But anyway, our actual point is to make sure we add that correction, but also remind that to our knowledge, this has never actually been mentioned by anyone before. In public discussions, it's always been referred to as the Chief and one of his assistant chiefs and that's it.
Comments (9)
Sid Anderson on 29 Mar 2005
The O's newsroom and editorial board have an obvious bias in covering this story.
They say that the newsroom and editorial room are disconnected, but in this case I have my doubts.
The One True b!X on 29 Mar 2005
Personally, I think there's an easier case to be made that there isn't enough separation between their own editorials and choosing material for the op-ed pages.
cleanhands on 29 Mar 2005
I've held a Top Secret/SCI clearance myself, and I can tell you that there's nothing nefarious about the notion that someone with a TS clearance rarely sees material higher than Secret.
In any modern security regimen, there are two aspects of the decision as to whether or not a given person has access to a particular item.
The first is the person's clearance, which is normally based on a background check (which, among other things, ensures that the person has nothing in their history that would indicate that giving them access to material poses a risk of disclosure).
The second, which appears to be largely overlooked in this discussion, is "need to know." This is not as cut-and-dried as the clearance held is; the folks making the decision to share a piece of information have to weigh the benefits of that information being more broadly disseminated against the risk of disclosure.
Every additional set of eyes that hit a piece of classified information increase the risk of disclosure, particularly when those eyes belong to politicians who are typically granted clearances on the basis of their position, rather than on the merits of their background check.
Leaks are nearly inevitable when dealing with folks who may have personal reservations about the nature of the material itself. When dealing with material pertaining to terrorist operations, it's no exaggeration to say that leaks can cause sources to be, in the polite euphemism, "compromised," that is to say, killed dead.
Information that explains how a particular subject came to be a target of investigation can most assuredly fall into this category, and I think that's the heart of the JTTF's concern with Portland's demands here - the City Council's demanding not only to circumvent the normal vetting process for issuance of security clearances, but implicit in their demands is that "need to know" will also be politically, rather than operationally, defined.
The One True b!X on 29 Mar 2005
Information that explains how a particular subject came to be a target of investigation can most assuredly fall into this category, and I think that's the heart of the JTTF's concern with Portland's demands here - the City Council's demanding not only to circumvent the normal vetting process for issuance of security clearances, but implicit in their demands is that "need to know" will also be politically, rather than operationally, defined.
I've seen no indication that the City has asked to "circumvent the normal vetting process" so I'm not sure where that statement is coming from.
But anyway, even if the matter of how a target came to be a target is, as you say, more a matter of "need to know" than a matter of "secret" or "top secret" there remains a rather critical problem here, and that's this: That information is the only way to make the determination whether or not Portland officers are in compliance with ORS 181.575 and ORS 181.850.
If it's the case (and I have no idea if it is, I'm just trying to explain the end-point of what you're arguing) that in the view of the FBI neither the officers themselves nor their superiors have a "need to know" that information for operational purposes, then we have no way to ensuring compliance with Oregon law.
And if that's the case, then there's no way to defend assigning Portland officers to the JTTF.
cleanhands on 29 Mar 2005
I've seen no indication that the City has asked to "circumvent the normal vetting process" so I'm not sure where that statement is coming from.
I believe it's implicit in the argument that you're making - that the requirements of Oregon statute trump the need to keep sources and methods out of the public (and thereby, the enemy's) eyes. Perhaps, then, we should consider changing the statute... just a suggestion.
Look, I'm not a fan of gov't secrecy, and I do think that it's overused. But we're not playing mumblety-peg here - our self-declared enemies want to see you dead, they want to see me dead, and they want to see my wife and children dead. This is not hyperbole; it's a simple statement of their aims. (Whether they have the capacity to achieve these aims is another discussion.)
Where mistakes have been made, I think that they've been honest mistakes - and if not, there are procedures to deal with abuses. We're not talking about setting up a system where people falsely accused are without recourse, but one where we can adequately detect and respond to the genuine threats that are out there.
The One True b!X on 29 Mar 2005
I believe it's implicit in the argument that you're making - that the requirements of Oregon statute trump the need to keep sources and methods out of the public (and thereby, the enemy's) eyes.
When it comes to the use of local and state law enforcement officers, the state statute does trump. If (and I'm deliberately using the word "if") its only through knowing "sources and methods" that we can ensure that state and local officers comply with state law, and if the Feds don't want "sources and methods" revealed, then the Task Force cannot be allowed to use our officers.
Perhaps, then, we should consider changing the statute... just a suggestion.
And I'd accept that as an entirely legitimate position to take, should anyone care to take it.
The problem is, none of the opponents of the oversight resolution are making the argument that the statutes need to be changed -- they're simply arguing that we should either just ignore them, or give local officers a pass on making sure they are being obeyed.
And that is not a legitimate position to take, unless one thinks the rule of law doesn't apply.
myrln on 29 Mar 2005
"There are procedures to deal with abuses." I know that's consistently claimed, but in practice, we tend to see them excused as "mistakes," which circumvents the need to deal with them. You can see the truth of that both locally and nationally. I not inclined to accept the words when no honest and effective action follows.
William on 30 Mar 2005
Cleanhands, it's nice to see you add your voice to the debate. Sincerely. Perhaps in the near future I'll have enough time to comment. For now, I enjoy seeing the back-and-forth with you and the others.
From Jordan's editorial bit...
[The assigned PDX officers] are among the most honorable, trustworthy people I've ever had the privilege of working with. I know that this community has concerns about balancing security interests and civil rights. I guarantee you that [they and] ALL OF MY EMPLOYEES, carry with them THOSE SAME concerns each and every day they come to work.
May I gag? I can't speak for the two Portland officers. They may be honorable, but after reading the "case" against Mayfield, we really do need better oversight if our two officers are ethically and morally on par with the FBI agents.
Sid on 30 Mar 2005
Personally, I think there's an easier case to be made that there isn't enough separation between their own editorials and choosing material for the op-ed pages.
b!X,
I'll have to agree with you. I think your post on the connection between Rowe and James B. Jeddeloh is the perfect case.
But on the JTTF story, I wonder. A case can't be made, of course, but when you look at the reporting The O has done on the Mayfield case, it's been excellent (I'm measuring excellence based on the O's overall news reporting, and not comparing it to, say, The Guardian) compared to the JTTF reporting.